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ABSTRACT
Louisiana, Washington, and California have changed their primary election
system to top-two primary systems. In this system, candidates are no longer nominated
by voters in their own party. Instead, the two candidates receiving the most votes proceed
to the general election, regardless of party affiliation. Proponents of the reform argue that
it will moderate their state legislatures, helping to reduce gridlock and polarization. The
parties and politicians argue that it will not change anything, but rather harm those in
office and those who are running for office. Little research had been done on the validity
of reformers claims, and most has focused on what impact it had on specific states. This
research evaluates the impact of top-two primaries on state legislature ideology in two of
the states that have implemented this reform, along with control states to account for
outside variables. This comparative research demonstrates that the top-two primary
makes liberal states even more liberal and makes legislatures more ideologically
homogeneous.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In the early 2000’s, California voters were faced with an unusual situation.
Coming through a major electricity and budget crisis, Governor Gray Davis, just over a
year into his second term, was on the ballot again. This time, however, it was up to the
voters to decide whether he would become the second governor in United States history
to be recalled. When polls closed on October 7th, 2003, it became clear that California
was headed for some radical changes. Actor Arnold Schwarzenegger won the election to
replace Governor Davis, picking up a governorship for the Republican Party in a state
that was becoming increasingly Democratic. Californians elected a man with no political
experience to try and clean up an unprecedented disaster. By electing a Republican
though, Californians wanted to ensure that the crises would be solved with bipartisan
solutions (Westly and Keeley 2010). Even though California was becoming more
Democratic, the appeal of divided government and compromise after a large crisis helped
Schwarzenegger win. Part of his legacy was to help pass Proposition 14 in 2010.
Proposition 14 was a proposed amendment to the California Constitution that
would change the way that primary elections were run. Instead of having primary
elections for each party, Proposition 14 would change the primary elections to top-two
primaries. A top-two primary is a primary election where every voter, regardless of their
party preference, gets the same ballot. Once the primary election is over, the two
candidates who get the most votes go on to the general election, no matter which party, if
any, they are representing. Governor Schwarzenegger became a crucial ally to the passing
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of Proposition 14 in 2010, telling voters that it will “finally giv[e] voters the power to
truly hold politicians accountable” (McGreevy and Dolan 2010). This has been the main
argument for proponents of top-two primaries, along with the thought that having more
diverse opinions involved in the first round of voting will lead to more candidates who
are representative of their constituents’ ideology (Moncrief and Squire 2013). When
politicians do something that goes against their constituents’ beliefs, a more moderate
candidate will come up in two or four years and oust them. While good on paper, very
little has been done to see if there is a noticeable change in election results following the
implementation of Proposition 14. One potential concern with the switch to the top-two
primary is that for states dominated by one political party, there is a chance that general
elections could end up being between two members of the same party. The 2016
California Senate general election featured two Democrats, adding fuel to this concern.
Because most legislation gets passed and implemented by the states, and since other
states are considering adopting similar reforms (Associated Press 2017), one needs to
look deeper and see how the elections of office holders in the state legislature has been
effected by Proposition 14.
In the other states, primary elections occur earlier in the year, and voters are
restricted to voting for just one party’s candidates. That means that there is a wide range
of ideologies that may not be accurately represented because the nominees are believed to
be chosen by the most partisan, ideologically extreme voters. When the general election
comes around, voters end up with two candidates who don’t share any views with each
other, even though they are trying to win moderate voters (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Stewart 2001). For voters who are more moderate, or who have liberal views on certain
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issues and conservative on others, this means that they are forced to decide which issue is
the most important for them. The top-two primaries aim to change this (Hill 2009).
Instead of simply choosing a candidate within the party that you are registered with or
voting in, every voter going to their polling place decides which candidate is the most
similar to them, and whichever two candidates receive the most votes are the ones who
face off in November, no matter what party they belong to.
When the top-two primary reform was debated and implemented in California,
proponents argued that this would reduce polarization and ensure more moderate
politicians are elected (Elias 2009, Hill 2009, Westly and Keeley 2010). Opponents,
which included both the California Democratic and Republican parties, feared that
elections would become more expensive and would lead to party leaders endorsing their
preferred candidates, limiting the moderating effects (Alexander 2010). However, in
2010, California voters approved the creation of the top-two primary for nearly every
election1 in the state. Since the full implementation in the 2012 elections, there has been
little research examining whether this experiment in the largest state of the union has paid
off. While the top-two primary has been used in Louisiana for decades and in
Washington since 2010, researchers did not focus on these elections because they were
considered outliers. Since the issue is gaining some traction and more states have adopted
the reform, researchers need to be able to test how this reform works so that other states
know what the consequences of reform may be.
Good governance ought to be a desire for constituents of all ideologies, and if one
change can produce more effective governance by having legislation that mirrors the

1

This does not include Presidential/Vice Presidential elections, Political Party County Central Committees,
County Councils, or non-partisan elections (League of Women Voters of California 2016)
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ideology of their state, shouldn’t it be upheld as a model for the nation to follow?
Research needs to answer this question not only to validate or correct proponents of
electoral reform, but also to show that political science can keep up with policy trends.
The following will examine the claims by both proponents and opponents of the top-two
primary debate in California to determine if the top-two primary affects chamber
ideology. Using a comparative case study examining the citizen and chamber ideologies
of California, Washington, Oregon, and New York, I find that the top-two primary tends
to further entrench the ideology of liberal states, but creates a more ideologically
homogeneous legislature.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE
Polarization
One of the largest political problems that has grown over time is polarization
(Pew Research Center 2016). While political polarization is nothing new and one would
expect people to disagree on issues, the three most recent administrations (President
Clinton, President Bush, and President Obama) saw a rare level of legislative opposition
from members of the ideologically opposite party. House Speakers Newt Gingrich,
Dennis Hastert, Nancy Pelosi, John Boehner, and Paul Ryan all held up legislation that
was part of the President’s agenda because of party politics. This created a budget crisis
multiple times over the previous decades, resulting in government shutdowns and threats
of even more shutdowns. There are certainly voters in both parties who desire the “just
say no” policies for a President who is not in their party, but when crises arise, voters
want to see their representatives taking action to resolve them (Kopan 2013).
Moreover, polarization has increased over the past few decades in part because of
the replacement of moderate candidates from both parties by more ideologically extreme
candidates (Fleisher and Bond 2004). Both parties have been rewarding candidates who
are willing to oppose everything that the other party is offering. Senator Cruz has made a
career out of simply saying no and being conservative on every issue, while Senator
Sanders has done the same on the left. Candidates with ideologies like these are no longer
just the fringe of the party, but are becoming mainstream due to seat replacement and
changes in the voting population. New England Republicans have been replaced by

6
Democrats who are more liberal because they vote with the Democrats on fiscal issues,
unlike the Republicans who voted conservatively on these issues. The same can be said
with Southern Democrats being replaced by Republicans who no longer vote with
Democrats on the fiscal issues like the Southern Democrats did. The loss of these “nonconformists” has pushed both parties to their ideological poles, increasing party cohesion
but losing chamber moderation (Fleisher and Bond 2004). This party cohesion has led to
legislators writing more partisan, ideologically extreme legislation. This ideologically
extreme legislation makes it harder to create a winning coalition, thus creating the
gridlock through polarization (Beckman and Kumar 2011). Gridlock makes it hard for the
legislature to address their constituents’ concerns, thereby undermining the very system
they are representatives in.
Polarization has changed the way that presidents act during times of divided
government (Cohen 2011). To voters, the appeal of divided government is that the
executive and legislative branches will have to moderate their positions in order to pass
legislation. However, it appears that because of the increase in polarization, presidents
are acting similar to their legislative counterparts and are staying with their party’s
agenda (Cohen 2011). If polarization continues to prevent presidents from enacting their
preferred policies, it makes sense that they would start to use other means to enact policy
change. This can be seen through the Obama administration and the actions President
Obama took on a wide range of issues from immigration to labor regulations. An
executive branch that is able to enact policies on their own may sound good for those
who are in the president’s party, but it harms accountability because they no longer have
to work with the legislative branch to enact policies.
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One issue that has become increasingly polarized is income inequality. Even
though the people who would benefit from legislation reigning in income inequality cross
party lines, the issue has been picked up by one of the major parties while being rejected
by the other (Soldano 2016). While high profile surrogates like Senators Elizabeth
Warren and Bernie Sanders have brought this issue to the forefront of political discourse,
the House and the Senate cannot agree on what needs to be done (McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal 2006). This shows that polarization on specific issues can lead to a stalemate in
legislation in the Senate (Garand 2010). Concern of income inequality has pervaded the
Democratic Party, however for most Republicans the issue simply is another example of
Democrats dividing the United States among demographics. This belief has trickled down
into the average voter, which is why there is so much polarization around an issue that on
its face is a concern for all constituents, not just those belonging to one party.
Polarization is not just found in national politics; states also have to deal with
highly polarized constituents. Shor and McCarty (2011) show the distance between party
medians for state legislatures and find that two of most polarized states in the years 19962008 were California and Washington, with California having just over twice the distance
between party medians than the average in the United States Congress. Washington is not
far behind, with a gap in legislative ideology that is about one and a half times the size as
the federal government. California and Washington have both very liberal and very
conservative areas in the state. The Republicans in the conservative areas of these states
act similarly to Southern Republicans, while the Democrats in the liberal areas are
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typically very liberal (Shor and McCarty 2011)2. This has created a huge divide between
the two parties because they hold vastly different views. The ideological divide between
party medians makes it hard for our representatives to come together and solve problems
with a bipartisan solution.
The high levels of polarization in these two states became the catalyst of primary
reform. In California, budget stalemates had become the norm because California’s
constitution required a two-thirds supermajority vote to pass a budget. While the state of
California has been reliably Democratic, until recently, the state legislature has not had
one party hold a supermajority in both chambers. This meant that California Republicans
and Democrats had to come together on every budget, and since the state was the most
polarized of all legislatures, it was difficult to create the necessary coalition to pass
budgets.
Some of this can be explained by the diversity of opinions within a legislative
district (Kirkland 2014). Kirkland (2014) finds that in the districts that have a high level
of ideological heterogeneity, the candidates that are elected tend to be more ideologically
extreme. This leads to an increase in party line voting, polarization, and gridlock. Since
states pass more legislation than the federal congress, polarization at the state level can
actually be more harmful for constituents’ everyday lives.
Another concern with polarization is that we do not know exactly how to fix it.
One reform that has been tried is to take control of redistricting, because some people
believe that gerrymandering has helped foster polarization. When districts are
gerrymandered to make it difficult for the minority party candidate to unseat the

Shor and McCarty’s (2011) figure 7 shows that the median for Washington Republicans look
ideologically similar to Mississippi’s, and California’s median is actually the most conservative
2
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incumbent, then the candidate who is in the majority party for their district does not have
to worry about concerns of voting too often on party lines. Some research examining the
impact of gerrymandering on polarization found that the districts that have changed
because of gerrymandering tend to be more polarized than the ones that were not (Carson
et al. 2007); however, there is still a debate in political science literature over the impact
of redistricting on polarization. If district gerrymandering is causing a problem with
polarization, then electoral reform to assuage some of these fears makes sense. States like
California have redistricting committees to try to take partisan politics out of
redistricting. Even with the redistricting commission, California voters wanted to go
further to try and increase accountability.
This is not to say that polarization is always bad. For those who live in districts
that are not heavily impacted by gerrymandering, polarization and party line voting has
made it much easier to punish members of Congress for their voting record (Jones 2010).
Jones (2010) argues that because members of Congress are voting in a partisan manner,
the approval rating of Congress and the party of the representative can be a heuristic for
how they should vote. This means that while polarization has created a roadblock in
policymaking if there is not a unified government, it can also help voters determine who
they should vote for. Ideally voters would be examining how their legislator is voting and
not just using this heuristic. That may have saved many Democrats in the 2010 election
when they were voted out of office for the Affordable Care Act passing even though they
voted against it, but having polarization as a tool for congressional accountability is
noteworthy. If one values accountability over governance, then polarization may be
beneficial. However, if one values governance and policies being enacted to deal with
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crises quickly, then polarization is a major concern. Therefore, redistricting may seem
like a good way to remove some polarization and produce more moderate candidates
(Altman and McDonald 2015), which would yield the same results that is desired from
electoral reform.
A reform that promises to remove polarization and gridlock may be appealing to
voters who are frustrated with what is happening in their legislature. Polarization has
made it difficult for issues to be addressed unless there is unified government. Unified
government tends to be the exception not the rule, meaning that voters who want their
legislators to address issues important to them would be open to arguments that state
moderate candidates will be more successful. The top-two primary reform is meant to
change the problems that many believe occur in primary elections.
Primary Elections and Ideology
Depending on the state that a voter lives in, they will have different requirements
for voting in primary elections. For some voters, they may only be able to vote if they are
registered with a political party. Others may be able to vote for whichever party they
choose, no matter if they are registered with that or any party. While the differing rules in
each state has led to some patchwork laws that confuse voters, ultimately states and state
parties have the right to decide what they will require for constituents to be involved in
their primary (Moncrief and Squire 2013).
Many believe that closed primaries lead to more ideologically extreme candidates
being nominated for the general election because the base of their party turns out more
than casual party voters. They argue that one way to reduce polarization is to change the
electoral system (Gerber and Morton 1998, Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). While this
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makes sense intuitively, political science research has come up with mixed results over
the effect that primary election types have on the ideology of general election candidates.
For some researchers, data has shown little impact of closed primary elections on moving
candidates closer to their ideological pole, but they did find that an increase in general
election competition makes it more likely for a moderate candidate to win (Hirano et al.
2010). While electoral reforms to increase competition sounds like a decent way to
moderate candidates from Hirano et al.’s (2010) research, the states that would benefit
most from this reform are dominated by one party. In these states, the chance of the
legislature passing a bill that would harm their party strength seems miniscule at best.
Other researchers have looked at the impact that open primaries have on legislator
ideology and found little evidence that legislators moderate their positions to appeal to a
wider base (McGhee et al. 2014, Rogowski and Langella 2015).
There has been some research suggesting that even if closed primary electorates
are more ideologically extreme, they still are aware of the political realities of their
candidate’s success in the general election (Mirhosseini 2015). Mirhosseini (2015) argues
that even the most ideologically extreme voters want to ensure that someone from their
party wins the general election, and if they nominate a candidate too far outside of the
political culture of their state, they will lose. This should result in moderate candidates
being nominated for the general election. Yet recent failed campaigns of candidates like
Republican Senate nominees Richard Mourdock, Todd Akin and Christine O’Donnell
seem counter to the ideas of Mirhosseini (2015), McGhee et al. (2014), Rogowski and
Langella (2015) and Hirano et al. (2010). In each of these races, Republicans had a
chance to either pick up a Senate seat from the Democrats or keep a seat held by an
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incumbent Republican and did not. Does the rise of the Tea Party explain the fact that
voters from Indiana, Missouri, and Delaware all went for ideologically extreme
candidates instead of their more moderate alternatives, or is it a symptom of a closed
primary system?
Using Twitter, King, Orlando, and Sparks (2016) found that candidates who are
perceived to be more ideologically extreme (determined by creating an ideal point based
on who they follow) are more likely to have success in their primary campaign. Other
researchers have looked more specifically at how the type of primary changes who wins.
Gerber and Morton (1998) found that in closed primary systems, Democratic nominees
tended to be more liberal and Republican nominees more conservative. Brady, Han, and
Pope (2007) found similar results, validating what people think the closed primary does.
McGhee et al. (2014) examined primary elections in states to determine how
primary structure effects the ideology of the candidates who make it to the general
election. While research suggests that closed primaries should lead to more liberal
Democrats and more conservative Republicans (Gerber and Morton 1998, Brady, Han,
and Pope 2007), McGhee et al. (2014) found the opposite. In their research, a state that
had open primaries actually led to more ideologically extreme nominees in the general
election. They also found that California appears to be the only state where primary
reform has had the effects reform proponents argued it would. The primary structure in
each state does appear to have an impact on the ideology of the candidate who makes it to
the general election, but researchers have come to different conclusions on how reform
affects the ideology of general election candidates.
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Is there a way to explain why some researchers are finding more extreme
candidates coming from closed primaries and some finding null results? One reason why
this could be the case is because of voters’ misattribution of beliefs to a candidate
because of their party label (Koch 2001). Koch (2001) found that on the issue of abortion,
voters were not able to successfully pinpoint when Democratic nominees held stronger
pro-life views than their party’s platform. When such controversial issues are at the
center of elections, candidates may be able to target the moderate voters by staking out
positions closer to the district median. Koch (2001) suggests that by taking this approach,
candidates may not be hurting their primary chances because voters who are not being
targeted with this message don’t know the actual position they hold. The timing of
elections could also help the more ideologically extreme candidates. For example, more
conservative candidates found success during the Tea Party wave in 2010 then would
have otherwise.
While bipartisanship is something that is upheld as a universally positive trait in
politics, there are times when partisanship and polarization are so high that just the
appearance of being willing to work with the other side can help candidates win elections
(Trubowitz and Mellow 2005). Bipartisanship is necessary to pass legislation during
times of divided government, but when one party controls the government, there is no
real reason to try and work for the median voter (Trubowitz and Mellow 2005).
Obviously the partisan makeup of a legislature can change drastically over the course of
two years, so depending on the political realities of the time, moderation may appear to
win out because of the need for bridge-building candidates. At other times, more
ideologically extreme candidates will win because they are either a part of the minority
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party picking up a seat on an anti-incumbent wave or because the majority party is so
dominant that a more extreme candidate can push through extremely ideological
legislation.
Top-Two Primary
One proposed reform for reducing ideologically extreme candidates is the top-two
primary. In fact, local news sources proclaimed that “California voters will have the rare
opportunity to free their government from the kind of ideological gridlock that leads to
lengthy budget stalemates” (Elias 2009) and that this reform would change a state that “is
being held hostage by partisan gridlock” (Westly and Keeley 2010). California is a
unique state in that it is considered to be liberal and favorable to Democrats, yet is one of
the most polarized states in the union (Shor and McCarty 2011, Moncrief and Squire
2013). For Californians, budget crises had become the norm, drastically impacting the
effectiveness of government. These crises, along with the recall of Governor Gray Davis
and subsequent election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, are excellent examples of the
polarization and gridlock that has stalled progress in The Golden State. The switch to the
top-two primary was intended to fix this problem.
Little research has been conducted on the impacts of the top-two primaries. After
California’s electoral reform, researchers started to examine the issue a bit more. The
argument that the top-two primary would lead to more moderate candidates being elected
has had little statistical support. When moderate candidates were on the ballot, they were
not elected even though this was one of the major intended effects (Ahler, Citrin, and
Lenz 2015). Some voters were unable to accurately determine the ideology of the
moderate candidate because of little information and a reliance on party labels (Ahler,
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Citrin, and Lenz 2015), although it did change the way that campaigns were run (Kousser
2015). In the 2014 statewide elections, some Republican candidates found success
running campaigns as moderate alternatives to the hardline conservatives, yet in the end
most still lost to their Democratic opponents in November (Kousser 2015), with the
notable exception of moderate Republican Frank Bigelow who overcame a traditional
conservative challenger in both the primary and the general election (Sinclair 2015). Is
this enough of a change then if only one party is experiencing changes in their nominees?
If not, is there a way that the parties can help moderate candidates?
Both the California Republican Party and the California Democratic Party were
opposed to the implementation of the top-two primary, fearing that it would weaken the
impact party elites have on elections. However, the 2014 midterm elections showed that
the state parties still have significant control over who makes it into the general election.
In fact, all but eight non-incumbents who were endorsed by their party made it to the
general election (Masket 2014). If this continues to hold true, then has the top-two
primary really made an impact on who makes it to the general elections? Maybe not, but
this is only accounting for the concerns of the party faithful in primary elections.
Reformers claimed that the change to a top-two primary would increase voter turnout,
mainly by engaging with those who would not want to be involved in a primary or are
unable to vote because they are not registered with a particular party.
Voter participation in the United States is relatively low, frequently coming in at
just under 60% for the presidential elections. Primary elections see even lower turnout
because of different institutional rules in each state that impact who can vote in which
primary (Moncrief and Squire 2013). Proponents of the top-two primary in California
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believed that switching to this primary system would increase voter turnout in both
rounds because more candidates with diverse ideologies would run, increasing the chance
that voters could find a candidate whose ideology matched theirs. Yet it appears that the
implementation of the top-two primary in California has done little to help increase voter
turnout. In fact, voter turnout in the 2012 and 2014 elections both saw decreases in
turnout (Hill and Kousser 2015) even though the top-two primary had been implemented
by this point. The argument that more candidates would run has not found much success
either. Washington implemented their top-two primary in 2008, hoping to achieve the
same things that proponents in California wanted. While it appears that the top-two
primary did not significantly impact the number of Republican candidates, there was
actually a decline in the number of Democratic candidates running against one another in
the primaries (Beck and Henrickson 2013). This surprising result is like that of Kousser’s
(2015) in that it appears to have only impacted one party. For top-two proponents whose
main goal was to see polarization decrease in their state, the fact that little change is
occurring should be concerning.
Another unintended consequence of the switch to the top-two primary is that in
situations where two members of the same party make it to the general election, some
voters may choose to abstain instead of vote for the “lesser” candidate. California may
have seen this happen already (Nagler 2015). When Californians went to vote in the
primary election, they still ended up voting for someone from their preferred party
(registered or just leaning), hurting the chance that crossover voters would help to elect
moderate candidates (Nagler 2015). Once all of the election data is finalized and
accessible, I am curious to see what impact the 2016 California Senate election had on
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voters. These two Democratic women, Kamala Harris and Loretta Sanchez, were both
left-leaning, even if Harris became the favorite among liberals. Are California
Republicans then expected to vote for the less liberal candidate? Proponents of the toptwo primary argue that they should because this is a better representation of the political
beliefs of their district. However, faithful Republicans may have found it impossible to
vote for one of these candidates, thereby abstaining from the first open senate election in
California in over two decades. This may have made some leaders and members of the
California Democratic Party happy, but for Republicans, this electoral reform hurt the
(admittedly small) chance of picking up a U.S. Senate seat. Proposition 14 may not have
been a success for the few California Republicans who pushed for it.
An interesting thing to note is that while both California and Washington are on
the West Coast, there does not seem to be a regional trend on the adoption of top-two
primaries. Oregon has had the top-two reform on the ballot twice in the past ten years,
and it failed both times by large margins. In neither election did the initiative even reach
35% support, even though in 2014 the pro-reform groups invested over three times the
amount that reform opponents did (Mapes 2014). The reasons for the failure to pass in
Oregon are not very clear. Similar to Washington and California, both the state
Republican and Democratic parties were against the change. Some third parties in
Oregon were also against the change, fearing that they would no longer be able to be on
general election ballots. Mapes (2014) also wrote that unions had been against the
change, and that the opponents of Measure 90 argued that it was only good for
corporations. Even though the states are somewhat similar ideologically, the arguments
around the primary reform potentially changed the way that Oregon voters viewed the
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issue. The arguments in favor of the top-two primary seem to only be successful in states
that view polarization as a problem within their state. Shor and McCarty’s (2011) graph
shows that Oregon has an ideological divide between the two major parties that is similar
to the one that exists on the federal level. Reform proponents may need to consider
adjusting their arguments to problems that the voters of the specific state believe need to
be solved.

19

CHAPTER THREE: THEORY
This study examines the arguments in favor of top-two reform. One of the key
arguments that top-two proponents use is that partisan gridlock is preventing legislatures
from taking action on key issues (Westly and Keeley 2010). The top-two primary should,
proponents argue, ensure that more moderate candidates win the election and work across
the aisle to pass bipartisan legislation. However, this implies that voters in state
legislative elections are holding their own representatives accountable, and not just
following national trends. Research has shown that while this is what was intended by the
federalism model, the state of national politics is affecting state legislatures (Rogers
2016). Rogers (2016) argues that when voters are choosing who to vote for in state
legislature elections they pay more attention to what is happening on the national level
than what their own legislators are doing. The popularity of the President is more likely
to determine who voters will choose than what state legislators are actually doing.
The decline of competitive House districts can also make it hard to see ideological
change (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006). According to Abramowitz,
Alexander, and Gunning (2006), districts are becoming more ideologically extreme, and
not just because of redistricting. As polarization is increasing, legislators are increasingly
voting the party line. Along with this, challengers in many races are unable to raise
enough money to fund a competitive election. Both have led to a decline in competitive
House races. Voting for House candidates is now more strongly tied to their view of the
president, similar to what Rogers (2016) argues. Along with the national trends, I expect
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the small number of competitive districts make it more likely to lead to elections with
two candidates from the same party. This would make it hard to lead to a more moderate
chamber, and in fact may exacerbate the ideology of the state. Liberal districts will now
hold general elections between two Democrats, with the liberal candidate having a larger
chance of success than if they were just a primary challenger. Again, this should not be
leading to a more moderate chamber, but rather one that is either similar to before the
reform or even more ideologically extreme.
If state legislature races are being determined by the approval of the President
(Rogers 2016), then it would be hard to see an electoral reform changing who is being
voted in. A primary reform would not change the impact that the President has on these
races. The fact that districts are becoming less competitive (Abramowitz, Alexander, and
Gunning 2006), also makes it hard to believe that voters will change to hold their own
representatives accountable instead of the national party. This leads me to believe that:

H1: The implementation of a top-two primary electoral system does not significantly
change the chamber’s ideology.

Simply put, national politics and a low number of competitive districts play too large of a
role on down ballot races, and this will make it hard for real ideological change to occur.
Whether constituents are conservative or liberal, Democrat or Republican, at the
end of the day they all want their government to work to enact their policy goals. In times
of crisis, all citizens want their government to be able to react to pressing matters, putting
the good of their state above party politics. If the top-two primaries work as proposed and
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lead to moderate candidates who are more willing to pass bipartisan legislation being
elected, then the data should be used to help expand this policy nationwide. If, however,
it does not advance these goals, researchers need to see that and work to understand why
change is not occurring like proponents wanted. Electoral reform is never easy and often
can have unintended consequences. The following research certainly will not be able to
examine every consequence of the switch to the top-two primary in Washington and
California, but it will examine the central talking point of reform proponents to give
statistical support or opposition to their claims.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

Examining the arguments made in favor of top-two primaries will help explain
how the reform has impacted chamber ideologies. Looking at California and Washington
before and after the reform shows the changes that occurred during the implementation of
the top-two primary. Since both states are considered liberal, they should already have a
pretty liberal median for both chambers. It is important to examine what they were both
before and after the reform to see if the top-two primary has worked as intended.
To test the impact of the primary system on ideology and voting behavior, there
needs to be some control variable to account for national factors. The reason why a
legislature may be more conservative or liberal during a specific timeframe could simply
be because of a political reaction to the current president and their administration (Rogers
2016). This happened in 2010 when Republicans picked up a large number of state
legislative seats because of the unpopularity of the Affordable Care Act (Brady, Fiorina,
and Wilkins 2011). This led me to find control states to try and account for some of these
national trends. The control states in conjunction with the President’s party variable with
control for some of the national and regional affects that could be impacting a state
legislature’s ideology.
Looking at the three states that have implemented the top-two primary, two are
either liberal or lean liberal (California and Washington) and one is conservative
(Louisiana). However, since data limitations did not allow Louisiana to be used in this
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research, the only ones that were left are both liberal. I thought the best way to examine
these was to find states that are politically similar. For Washington, I chose Oregon
because of their geographical locations being similar and because they tend to be of a
similar ideological bent. While both are Democrat controlled, they have opportunities for
Republican candidates to be competitive and even win statewide office. California was
unique in that its size required it to be paired with another state that was large and
diverse, but also considered liberal. This left only one option: New York. While
unfortunately I lose some regional controls, the two states are similar in their ideology
and statewide officer holders and are regularly represented by Democratic politicians,
with a few notable exceptions in the past two decades that I examine.
I measure chamber ideology for the four states (two states with the top-two
primary and the two control states) using Shor and McCarty’s (2011) data3 for the years
1997 through 2014 (Table 1). Shor and McCarty’s data examines the ideology of
individual state legislators and compiles an average chamber score for each state. This
allows researchers to examine how legislators are voting and to see what changes in
ideology are occurring within chambers over time. It is worth noting that Shor and
McCarty’s data is not without its flaws. For one, the data relies heavily on the ratings of
four interest groups (National Federation of Independent Business, National Rifle
Association, AFL-CIO, and the League of Conservation Voters). These four groups
certainly do not cover every policy issue, and may not accurately represent the issues of
the state. If states are not debating issues of this nature or only have a few issues during
the year, they are trying to assign an ideology score based on just a limited number of

3

Updated in 2015; values range from -1.42 for the most liberal chamber median to 0.611 in the most
conservative chamber median
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votes. They also rely on NPAT scores, which can have the problem of non-response bias
and may not go in depth on the issues they are being surveyed on. For example, there is a
large difference between saying that health care should be available versus affordable,
and the phrasing of the question may affect how people answer. However, because of
their data availability for state legislatures, imperfect data became better than no data.
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Table 1 Chamber Ideology Medians by Year
California

New York

Washington

Oregon

Lower
Median

Upper
Median

Lower
Median

Upper
Median

Lower
Median

Upper
Median

Lower
Median

Upper
Median

2014

-1.189

-1.395

-1.063

-.542

-.858

-.036

-.688

-.525

2013

-1.218

-1.370

-1.051

-.542

-.846

-.036

-.688

-.525

2012

-1.420

-1.332

-1.051

-.232

-.775

-.542

-.201

-.472

2011

-1.420

-1.332

-1.084

-.232

-.833

-.572

-.201

-.472

2010

-1.416

-1.202

-1.094

-.750

-.812

-.666

-.727

-.451

2009

-1.418

-1.132

-1.128

-.750

-.798

-.666

-.727

-.451

2008

-1.390

-1.122

-1.032

-.363

-.819

-.668

.042

-.484

2007

-1.390

-1.122

-1.097

-.232

-.827

-.668

-.563

-.517

2006

-1.251

-1.181

-1.049

-.232

-.782

-.542

.156

-.484

2005

-1.251

-1.181

-1.067

-.222

-.782

-.179

.156

-.484

2004

-1.287

-1.138

-1.049

-.183

-.711

.185

.183

-.341

2003

-1.287

-1.138

-1.049

-.183

-.711

.185

.183

-.341

2002

-1.170

-1.138

-.993

-.208

-.395

-.006

.042

-.168

2001

-1.170

-1.138

-.995

-.208

-.151

-.006

.042

-.168

2000

-.953

-1.014

-1.032

-.208

-.151

-.639

.196

.028

1999

-.953

-1.014

-1.023

-.208

.057

-.639

.196

.028

1998

-.848

-.820

-1.023

-.223

.611

.430

-.043

.003

1997

-.848

-.820

-1.023

-.183

.609

.423

-.043

.003

The next variable I use is for the top-two primary. This is the main independent
variable, used to measure when the chambers held primary elections using the top-two
reform. These are measured simply using 1 if the primary was a top-two primary and a 0
if it was any other type of primary. Along with that, I build a regression model using
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citizen ideology (Berry et al. 1998, Jordan and Grossmann 2016)4 and the President’s
party. The citizen ideology variable creates a value for the district based on the ideology
of members of congress, the ideology of their challenger, and the election results. This
gives them an estimate of what the median ideology is in the district, allowing me to
examine what impact citizen ideology has on the ideology of their legislators.
I also use the President’s party as a control for the national political climate.
Including national political climate data is important because Presidential politics plays
an impact on the electoral successes of state legislative candidates (Rogers 2016). If the
President plays a role in the successes of state legislative candidates from the President’s
party, then it is important to note what party they belong to. Following Rogers (2016)
argument, it makes sense that the lower and upper chamber median ideology scores
would be impacted by the President’s party.
After running the regression models, I look at the correlation between the state
legislature chambers and citizen ideology. The first correlation examines the control
chambers and the chambers before the implementation of the top-two primary. The
second will look at the chambers after the implementation. Examining this data can
explain if the reform is helping to bring the chambers more in line with citizen ideology
and if there is a change in correlation between the chambers following the reform. A
stronger correlation between citizen ideology and chamber ideology is good for
representation, although it may not help moderation. The chambers having an increased
correlation means that legislation should be able to pass both chambers easier, increasing
the efficiency of government.

An increase in citizen ideology score means a more liberal ideology in Berry et al.’s (1998) data, while a
decrease in Shor and McCarty’s (2015) data means a more liberal ideology
4
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

When examining the data from California and Washington, the implementation of
the top-two primary does have a significant impact on the chamber’s ideology (Table 2).
The top-two reform reaches statistical significance in every model, and in every model
the top-two reform moves the chamber in a liberal direction. While it appears that the
top-two reform was not successful in moderating the chambers, it is interesting to note
that changes occurred in the liberal direction. Even though both Washington and
California are considered liberal states, the top-two reform created a more liberal
chamber. Citizen ideology is statistically significant in the two lower chamber models,
showing that the lower chambers are doing a good job representing the views of their
constituents.

28
Table 2 Median Chamber Ideology Scores Regression
Lower Chamber

Upper Chamber

Model 1 Model 2

Model 1

Citizen Ideology

-.024**** -.025**** .00009

Top-Two

-.434*** -.428**

Pres Party

Model 2
.001

-.339*** -.354***

.018

-.047

(Constant)

.806*

.817*

-.464

-.493

# of observations

68

68

68

68

Adjusted R2

0.138

0.124

0.039

0.026

Sig.: **** <.01 *** <.05 ** <.10 * <.15

Top-two reform in California and Washington did not create the moderate
chambers that proponents had wanted. While the changes in ideology (and constitutional
amendment for California) may have helped reduce gridlock, it does not appear that this
change occurred because of moderating chambers. In fact, in all four of the models, the
top-two reform created a more liberal chamber. Creating more liberal chambers can help
remove the ideological gridlock that proponents were wanting to remove. In this aspect,
the top-two reform may have worked, but only because the chamber is becoming more
liberal.
While the regression shows how the implementation of the top-two primary
affected legislature ideology, it is also important to examine what was happening both
before and after reform in terms of chamber median. In 1997, the first year used in my
models, the citizen ideology in California was 53.75, the lower chamber median was .848, and the upper chamber median was -.820. In 2010, the year the top-two reform was
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passed by voters, citizen ideology was 58.17, the lower chamber median was -1.416, and
the upper chamber median was -1.202. The latest year used in my data was 2013, which
had a citizen ideology of 57.35, a lower chamber median of -1.218, and an upper
chamber median of -1.370. The raw data appears to show a moderating effect on the
lower chamber median, while the upper chamber has the changes in line with what the
regression model suggested. A change in the chamber median toward the center could
potentially show that the reform is working as proponents had intended, however because
there is only one year that shows a moderating effect it is hard to know the importance of
the reform on this.
One important fact not accounted for in the models is the change in term limit
laws in California. In 2012, California voters approved an initiative that changed the way
that term limits were calculated in the state. Before 2012, California legislators were
limited to a set number of terms in each chamber. Following the reform, California
legislators could serve a total of twelve years, no matter which chamber they are in. This
means that legislators can serve up to six terms in the State Assembly or three terms in
the State Senate, or any combination that leads to twelve years. This could have some
impact on the changes in ideology; however, legislators that were in office when the
initiative was approved were grandfathered in to the old law. The real change will not be
noticed until 2024, when the first group of legislators are term limited out of their
chambers under the new rules. So, while it is important to note that this could change the
dynamics of some individuals who decided to run, it is hard to quantify any effect it has
had this early on.
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The Washington raw data looks similar to what the regression model is
suggesting. The first year in the model, 1997, had Washington’s citizen ideology score as
50.96, a lower chamber median of .609, and an upper chamber median of .423. In 2008
when voters approved the implementation of a top-two primary, the citizen ideology
score was 68.77, a lower chamber median of -.819, and an upper chamber median of .668. The most recent year in the model, 2013, had a citizen ideology score of 52.97, a
lower chamber median of -.846, and an upper chamber median of -.036. The lower
chamber moved in a more liberal direction following implementation of the top-two
primary just as the models suggested. The upper chamber had a sharp moderating turn in
2013, where the median went from -.542 the year before to -.036. Part of this can be
accounted for in the fact that Republicans picked up a seat in the upper chamber, but
more importantly the change is probably a reflection of Washington’s coalition Senate
(Schoesler and Tom 2012). While the Washington Senate had a Democratic majority, two
Democratic senators caucused with all the Republicans to create a “Majority Coalition
Caucus”. This change is what likely created the moderation, and I am not sure that this
occurred because of the top-two primary.
Examining the correlations yielded interesting results. The first correlation with
the control states and the chambers prior to reform show that citizen ideology does have a
significant effect on the lower chamber median (Table 3). This suggests that constituents
were being accurately represented by the lower chambers, but not represented in the
upper chambers. This makes sense considering the districts are typically smaller and
designed to be more intimate between the representative and the voters. The state upper
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and lower chambers are also correlated, suggesting that there is some ideological
homogeneity.
Table 3 Correlations All States Before or Without Reform

Citizen Ideology

Pearson Correlation

Citizen
Ideology

State Upper
State Lower
Chamber Median Chamber Median

1

.018

-.378**

.890

.003

59

59

59

.018

1

.584**

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
State Upper Chamber Median Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.890

N

59

61

61

-.378**

.584**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.003

.000

N

59

61

State Lower Chamber Median Pearson Correlation

.000

61

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The correlation of chambers that have enacted the top-two reform shows a more
homogeneous legislature, although there is now no significant impact of citizen ideology
on chamber median (Table 4). The upper and lower chambers are more strongly
correlated with one another, suggesting a more ideologically homogeneous legislature
that may help reduce gridlock because legislation making it through one chamber should
be ideologically similar to what the other chamber would desire. More legislation should
be sent to the governor’s desk, making or a more efficient government.
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Table 4 Correlations of States After Reform

Citizen Ideology

Pearson Correlation

Citizen
Ideology

State Upper
State Lower
Chamber Median Chamber Median

1

-.152

.014

.696

.972

9

9

9

-.152

1

.824**

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
State Upper Chamber Median Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.696

N

9

11

11

.014

.824**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.972

.002

N

9

11

State Lower Chamber Median Pearson Correlation

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.002

11
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

When looking at the results from the regression models, it appears that the toptwo primary reform does have an impact on a chamber’s ideology. Top-two primary
reform was statistically significant in the liberal direction, even though the two states in
the models are already considered to be liberal. This implies that the top-two primary
does have an impact on legislator ideology, disproving my hypothesis. However, this
does not mean that reformers had the right arguments in every state. In the liberal states, a
top-two reform may move the chamber further to the left.
If this is true, more research needs to be done to study voting behavior based on
ideological preferences. Another possible explanation is that the top-two primary in
California and Washington is helping more liberal Democrats take down incumbents in a
system that had previously made it very hard to do so. Because of the small number of
competitive districts (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006), in large cities like
Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Sacramento, the chance of a Republican even making it
to the general election is slim. However, this opens the door for someone to run as a more
liberal Democrat and force a general election campaign between two members of the
same party. In this scenario, reform proponents argue that voters that belong to other
parties should be voting for the candidate that is most like them (a Republican should be
voting for the moderate Democrat, a Green Party voter for the more liberal Democrat).
But what if this voter decides not to vote in this race? This would create an election
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where the incumbent would have to try and defend their moderate positions in a district
that may reward those that are more liberal. If seat replacement is the reason why there is
a change in the chamber median, proponents would be incorrect to argue that they are
moderating the chamber, however they could claim that the legislators are now more
ideologically similar to their constituents.
It appears that the party of the President did not impact the chamber median for
the states in my model, possibly conflicting with Rogers’ (2016) research. While there
were many losses for Democrats across the country during President Obama’s
administration, in most of the chambers used in my models, the chambers became more
liberal during these eight years. The expectation that there would not be an impact on
ideology seems to be incorrect. The top-two reform does impact the ideology of state
legislatures, although the impact appears to be different than one would suggest and the
party of the President did not have a significant effect on these four states.
In both California and Washington, the top-two reform created a more liberal
legislature. Does this mean that the top-two primary only works in one way? Not
necessarily, but it is interesting that there appears to be less of a moderating impact than
an entrenching of the state’s dominant ideology. This suggests that either more liberal
Democrats are winning elections, or that there is some truth to the fact that moderate
Republicans will carry some crossover voters to win against a more conservative
Republican. This leads me to reject my hypothesis, because it does look like the top-two
primary is changing who gets elected; it just isn’t necessarily changing it in the way that
proponents wanted it to.
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The top-two primary also appears to have helped reduce the “ideological” (Elias
2009) and “partisan gridlock” (Westly and Keeley 2010) that proponents wanted. This
was not done by moderating the candidates, but rather by making the two chambers more
ideologically homogeneous. The two chambers became more strongly correlated both
following implementation of the top-two primary and when compared to their control
states. A more homogeneous legislature may be beneficial for governance, but the lack of
significance for citizen ideology could be concerning. If the chambers are enacting more
legislation to try and solve problems for their constituents, that would be a benefit to
governance. However, if they are passing more legislation but less representative of their
constituents, that should be a concern. Legislatures should not be enacting policies that
only they want, and the lack of significance for citizen ideology in addition to
Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning (2006) research showing a decline in competitive
elections suggests that there would be little incentive for legislators to vote in line with
the ideology of their citizens.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Further research will need to be done to examine what other variables may be
affecting state chamber ideology. While I had intended to use measures of bipartisan
legislation passage and the role of interest groups, time and data restrictions did not allow
for these to be added. Future research will want to add in these variables to examine if
these factors change the direction and strength of the top-two reform. There is also a need
to examine whether voting behavior changes depending on which candidates make it to
the general election. The prospect of conservative and liberal constituents reacting
differently to a ballot featuring two candidates of the ideologically opposing party can
lead to examples of other situations when reform may only be impacting one group of
voters and not another. Adding the election results from 2014 on would also help to show
some variation. In particular, the U.S. Senate race in California can be a good case study
to see if there is a lower statewide turnout for this race than the presidential one, since it
was the first statewide contest for an open seat that had two members of a single party on
the general election ballot.
Overall, it appears that the top-two primary reform does impact the chamber’s
ideology. The data, along with previous research like Sinclair (2015), suggests that the
reason why there is a change in ideology has less to do with a different party winning the
seat than with a moderate Republican winning over a conservative Republican. Being
able to add in the voting behavior of legislators in future projects can examine whether
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these more moderate legislators are voting in different ways than their more conservative
counterparts.
While the debate in California centered on the prospect of holding legislators
accountable and removing ideological gridlock, many assumed that this would come true
because of a change to a more moderate legislature. The data suggests that if there was
any change in California that helped ease gridlock, it was not because of moderate
legislators coming in. Gridlock may have been eased through a more solidly liberal block
of Democratic legislators enacting policies with a Democratic governor. This can be good
if the reformers real goal was for a more efficient government, but based on the
arguments and those who were making them, the top-two reform in California was a
failure. Liberal Democrats won, but moderate Democrats and all Republicans lost. For
states that are liberal, the top-two primary will not help to moderate the chamber, but will
create a more liberal chamber that can potentially be more efficient.
In terms of efficiency, the top-two primary reform is great for liberal states.
Creating a more ideologically homogeneous legislature can make it easier for legislation
to reach the governor’s desk, helping to grease the wheel of the legislative process. For
moderation, the reform is not working as intended for liberal states. A state deciding if
they want to enact this reform should then examine what it is that they are trying to
achieve. Efficiency versus moderation is a debate that we have had over federal politics
for decades, but now it is in the hands of state legislators and voters to decide if they want
a more efficient government or a more moderate government. It is my hope that this
research will help guide their decision.
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